Hello Vercel team and community,
I'm evaluating a security architecture for a payment-processing application hosted on Vercel.
The proposed architecture uses a separately governed service responsible for issuing payment-provider Checkout Sessions. The application frontend and ordinary deployment pipeline would be treated as untrusted request initiators.
I'm trying to determine whether Vercel offers a supported mechanism for an external authorization service to independently verify the exact approved Function artifact executing at the time a privileged operation is requested.
Specifically:
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Can Vercel's workload identity mechanisms attest the final deployed/executing Function artifact, including relevant dependencies and configuration, rather than only identifying a project, environment, or deployment?
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Can an external credential broker use that evidence to deny credential access to modified, historical, Preview, or otherwise unapproved Function revisions?
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If standard Vercel OIDC claims are insufficient for this requirement, is there another supported Vercel mechanism or recommended architecture?
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Are there documented limitations concerning Function instances, regional execution, artifact substitutions, token replay, or credential reuse that should inform this design?
I'm aware that Vercel supports OIDC Federation. My question is specifically about the distinction between deployment identity and independently verifiable executable identity.
I'm looking for a supported platform capability or a documented limitation, not reporting a vulnerability.
Thank you for any guidance or references to relevant Vercel engineering documentation.